Pre-Authentication Schemes for UMTS-WLAN Interworking by Ali Al Shidhani & VictorCM Leung
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
Volume 2009, Article ID 806563, 16 pages
doi:10.1155/2009/806563
Research Article
Pre-Authentication Schemes for UMTS-WLAN Interworking
Ali Al Shidhani and Victor C. M. Leung
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of British Columbia, 2332 Main Mall,
Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z4
Correspondence should be addressed to Ali Al Shidhani, alia@ece.ubc.ca
Received 31 January 2009; Accepted 30 April 2009
Recommended by Yang Xiao
Interworking Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS) and IEEE 802.11 Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs)
introduce new challenges including the design of secured and fast handover protocols. Handover operations within and between
networks must not compromise the security of the networks involved. In addition, handovers must be instantaneous to sustain
the quality of service (QoS) of the applications running on the User Equipment (UE). There is a need to design fast and secured
handover protocols to operate in UMTS-WLAN interworking architectures. This paper proposes two secured pre-authentication
protocols in the UMTS-WLAN interworking architectures. Performance analysis of the proposed protocols show superior results in
comparison to existing protocols in terms of authentication signaling cost, authentication delay and load on critical nodes involved
in the authentication procedure. Additionally, the security of the proposed protocols was verified by the Automated Validation of
Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) security analyzer.
Copyright © 2009 A. Al Shidhani and V. C. M. Leung. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
properly cited.
1. Introduction
UMTS-WLAN interworking is being widely considered by
cellular service providers because of its advantages for both
end users and service providers. The 3rd Generation Part-
nership Project (3GPP) has recently published specifications
detailing suggested UMTS-WLAN interworking architec-
ture [1]. A simplified architecture following a nonroaming
reference model [1] is shown in Figure 1. Interworking
UMTS and WLAN introduces new handover and security
challenges. Handovers in general are classified into hori-
zontal and vertical handovers [2]. Horizontal Handovers
(HH) occur when roaming within a network employing the
same wireless technology while Vertical Handovers (VH)
occur when roaming between networks employing diﬀerent
wireless technologies. Handovers are further subdivided into
link-layer (L2) handovers and Internet Protocol (IP)-layer
(L3) handovers [2].
Link-layer handover handles association and authen-
tication of the WLAN User Equipment (UE) to a target
attachment point. IP-layer handover is generally based on
Mobile IP (MIP) functionalities and aims to register a
new UE IP address in the visited network. This paper
discusses the authentication operation during link-layer
HH within WLANs when operating in a UMTS-WLAN
interworking architecture. In such architecture, the UE must
be initially authenticated by servers in the UMTS Home
Network (UHN) such as the Home Location Register (HLR),
Home Subscriber Server (HSS), and Home Authentication,
Authorization, and Accounting (HAAA) server [3].
Several UMTS-WLAN authentication schemes have been
proposed in the literature. Kambourakis et al. [4], Prasith-
sangaree and Krishnamurthy [5], and Chen et al. [6] pro-
posed using Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport
Layer Security (EAP-TLS) [7, 8], EAP-Tunneled TLS (EAP-
TTLS) [9], and Protected EAP (PEAP) [10], respectively, to
authenticate a UE in the UMTS-WLAN interworking archi-
tecture. These authentication protocols are based on public
key cryptography and require digital certificate management
to operate properly.
3GPP recommends invoking EAP with Authentication
and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA) to authenticate a UE in
the UMTS-WLAN interworking architecture [3, 11]. EAP-
AKA relies on pre-shared secrets held by the UE and HSS
and does not require public key cryptography or digital
certificate management. In EAP-AKA, the UE, and the
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Figure 1: Simplified UMTS-WLAN interworking architecture.
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Figure 2: EAP-AKA authentication protocol.
HAAA exchange series of EAP messages to request/respond
authentication information. HAAA communicates with the
HSS to obtain Authentication Vectors (AVs) as shown in
Figure 2. The UMTS Subscriber Identity Module (USIM)
application on the UE and the HSS execute special message
authentication and key generation functions known as “f1–
f5” functions [12] to generate AVs. On successful mutual
authentication, the UE and HAAA derive important security
keys like the Master Session Key (MSK), Extended MSK
(EMSK), and Transient EAP Key (TEK) [11]. The integrity
and confidentiality of EAP messages are protected by K auth
and K encr keys derived from TEK. The UE and its associated
WLAN Access Point (AP) use MSK to derive a new session
key, the Transient Session Key (TSK), which is later used
to secure communications between them. TSK is derived
from MSK using the 4-way handshake protocol introduced in
IEEE 802.11i [13]. Due to the need to retrieve authentication
information from authentication servers in the UHN, EAP-
AKA authentication protocol is prone to high authentication
delays and introduces redundant signaling traﬃc between
the WLAN network and the UHN.
Generally, handover delay caused by roaming between
and within WLANs is composed of delays like AP scanning
delays [14], authentication delays, and MIP registration
delays in the case of L3 handover. Several proposals reported
in the literature focused on minimizing authentication
delays during HH in autonomous WLAN networks [15–
20]. However, the problem of reducing authentication
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delays during HH when the UE operates in UMTS-WLAN
interworking architecture remains mostly unexplored. In
such architecture, authentication delay largely contributes
to the overall handover delay because the UE needs to
communicate with the UHN to successfully complete the
authentication procedure. In practice, the UHN could be
far away from the UE and separated by multiple networks
and proxy AAA servers, resulting in high authentication and
handover delays. Due to these reasons, invoking EAP-AKA
protocol whenever WLAN HH takes place in UMTS-WLAN
interworking architecture is unfavorable.
In our preliminary work, we have proposed two protocols
to reduce authentication delays during WLAN HH in
UMTS-WLAN interworking architecture. The proposed pro-
tocols were immature and initial and limited performance
and security discussion were presented [21]. In this paper,
we present improvements to the protocols and conduct
extensive and thorough performance and security analysis
on them. The comprehensive performance analysis considers
important metrics like authentication signaling cost, authen-
tication delay, and resource optimization of critical nodes
involved in the authentication procedure. The thorough
security analysis employs widely-accepted formal security
verification tools to confirm that our protocols can withstand
all forms of authentication and key secrecy attacks. In
comparison with EAP-AKA protocol, our protocols achieve
outstanding performance while preserving adequate security.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we report some related works. In Section 3 we give detailed
descriptions of our proposed protocols. In Section 4 we
evaluate the performance of our protocols. In Section 5 we
analyze the security of our proposed protocols. In Section 6
we present some conclusions.
2. Related Work
Research to reduce authentication delay during HH in
WLANs in the context of UMTS-WLAN interworking archi-
tecture is in its initial stages. 3GPP did not specify protocols
specific to UMTS-WLAN interworking to support WLAN
HH. Thus, EAP-AKA protocol is invoked whenever HH takes
place. On the other hand, many research studies are focusing
on WLAN HH in autonomous WLANs architecture. In
terms of network architecture, a major diﬀerence between
authenticating a roaming UE in autonomous WLANs archi-
tecture in contrast to UMTS-WLAN interworking archi-
tecture is that authentication servers reside in the WLAN
network in the former case and they reside in the UHN
in the latter case. Another diﬀerence is that IEEE recom-
mends invoking EAP-TLS protocols in autonomous WLANs,
while 3GPP recommends invoking EAP-AKA authentica-
tion protocols in UMTS-WLAN interworking architecture.
Therefore, existing HH authentication protocols designed
specifically for autonomous WLANs architecture are not
directly applicable over the UMTS-WLAN interworking
architecture. Besides, several HH authentication protocols
proposed for WLANs attain reduction in authentication
delay at the cost of operational and security problems like
introducing extra signaling overhead in the WLAN network
[15–17] or demonstrating high dependency on UE mobility
patterns [18, 19].
The rudimentary handover and security support in
the base IEEE 802.11 protocol [22] has been enhanced in
IEEE802.11i [13], IEEE802.11f [23], and IEEE802.11r [24].
Handover protocols in IEEE802.11i are optional and have
seen limited implementation and deployment support [25].
Handover protocols in IEEE802.11f are not suitable for
UMTS-WLAN interworking environments because strong
trust agreements are required between WLAN administra-
tion domains for secure inter-Extended Service Set (inter-
ESS) HH across these WLAN domains. On the other hand,
IEEE802.11r supports only intra-ESS HH within specific
WLAN domain but not inter-ESS HH.
Many papers in the literature proposed mechanisms
to reduce intra- or inter-ESS HH delays in autonomous
WLAN architecture. Some papers achieved this goal by
preauthenticating the UE before handover, predistributing
security keys, predicting UE’s next move, introducing public
key cryptography, or adopting hybrid techniques combining
more than one method. Mishra et al. [15], Kassab et al. [16],
and Hur et al. [17] proposed proactive key distribution using
neighbor graphs to predict potential Target AP (TAP). These
schemes utilize EAP-TLS and may result in unnecessary
distribution of keys and increase signaling overhead in
the WLAN as the number of UEs increases. Pack and
Choi [18] and Mukherjee et al. [19] proposed mechanisms
to predict UE mobility and hence preauthenticating the
UE with the TAP before handover. The protocols share
similar drawbacks as in [15–17] and their operations are
restricted to intra-ESS HH. In the context of UMTS-WLAN
interworking architecture, the UE roams between WLANs
belonging to diﬀerent administration and security domains,
which imply that protocols designed to work in autonomous
WLAN architectures like in [15–19] cannot be simply
migrated to operate in the UMTS-WLAN interworking
architecture.
Techniques to reduce delays in the event of WLAN HH
in UMTS-WLAN interworking architecture have been pro-
posed in [20, 26, 27]. Long et al. [20] proposed localized UE
authentication for inter-ESS HH, in an architecture similar
in concept to the UMTS-WLAN interworking architecture.
The proposed mechanism requires that the UE should be
authenticated by its home network while roaming. This
protocol achieves fast inter-ESS HH by means of public
key cryptography. Lee et al. [26] proposed a location-
aware handover protocol. Location-aware service brokers
are introduced in the interworking architecture to predict
UE movement and perform fast authentication during
handover. This scheme aims at oﬄoading the 3G AAA servers
from handling authentication whenever the UE moves, thus
reducing authentication and handover delays. The drawback
of this approach is that it requires major modifications to the
existing 3G-WLAN interworking architecture. Lim et al. [27]
proposed a protocol to reduce probing/scanning delays of the
target AP. The downside to this solution is that APs must
perform some of the functionalities of UMTS base station
and share some control channels with it.
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In comparison with protocols in [4–6, 15–20, 26, 27],
our proposed protocols enjoy unique characteristics which
make them first in their kind. Firstly, they are designed to
operate in the 3GPP-specified UMTS-WLAN interworking
architecture and adopt a variation of EAP-AKA protocols
according to 3GPP recommendations unlike [4–6, 15–17].
Secondly, they are independent of UE movement pattern
or TAP predictions contrasting protocols in [18, 19, 26].
Thirdly, they do not rely on public key cryptography like
protocols in [4–6, 15–17, 20], which might require substan-
tial processing resources that may not be available in mobile
UEs. Fourthly, they do not require major modifications to
APs or the introduction of new servers in the UMTS-WLAN
interworking architecture as the case in [26, 27]. Finally they
avoid unnecessary generation and pre-distribution of keys to
TAPs and are therefore more eﬃcient and secure.
3. Proposed Protocols
Novel pre-authentication protocols are proposed to improve
intra- and inter-ESS WLAN HH when operating in a UMTS-
WLAN interworking architecture. Intra- and Inter-WLAN
ESS Fast Pre-authentication protocols (Intra/Inter-WLAN
FP) preauthenticate the UE locally before handover takes
place which results in reduction in the handover delay. To
realize our proposed protocols, simple modifications are
required to the standard EAP-AKA authentication protocol.
3.1. Assumptions. Firstly, some general assumptions are
outlined which are similar in part to the assumptions
made by 3GPP for authenticating a UE in UMTS-WLAN
Interworking architecture [3].
(i) A WLAN AAA (WAAA) server exists in every WLAN.
WAAA controls multiple APs forming a “WLAN
domain.” The WAAA and all APs in its domain must
share a Long Term Security Association (LTSA).
(ii) WAAAs belonging to diﬀerent WLAN domains must
have LTSA and roaming agreements with the HAAA
in the UHN.
(iii) WAAA and UE must maintain a WLAN counter
(WC) which indicates the number of times pre-
authentications has been performed. They are incre-
mented by both corresponding nodes after every
successful pre-authentication.
(iv) The HAAA or WAAA must supply a new UE local
identity to the UE during authentication session to
be used in future pre-authentications.
3.2. Modifications to EAP-AKA Protocol. In the standard
EAP-AKA protocol, the UE and the HAAA must generate
MSK and EMSK after a successful authentication [3, 11].
MSK is transported to the AP to be used in generating a
TSK. EMSK is generated but its usage is not yet specified.
We propose using EMSK to derive additional keys to achieve
faster pre-authentication without compromising security.
We extended the key hierarchy in EAP-AKA protocol
by introducing WLAN domain-level and local-level keys
derived from MSK and EMSK. Domain-level keys are unique
keys derived by the HAAA and the UE per WLAN domain.
Local-level keys are unique keys derived by the WAAA and
the UE per AP within the WLAN domain. The local-level
keys are later used to derive TSKs.
MSK is used to derive additional keys to speed UE’s
reauthentication operations only, that is, without handover.
Usage of MSK to speed reauthentication operation in UMTS-
WLAN interworking is described in [28]. We propose using
EMSK as the root key for handover pre-authentications. The
keys derived from EMSK are the Handover Root Key (HOK),
the Domain-level Handover key (DHOK) and the Local-level
handover key (LHOK). LHOK is ultimately used to derive
TSK in Intra- and Inter-WLAN FP. To derive the required
additional keys we suggest the following modifications to
EAP-AKA authentication protocol as depicted in Figure 3.
(i) The HAAA generates the next local ID, IDWLAN, to be
used by the UE in the next pre-authentication and a nonce
value (HN). The HAAA should indicates the permitted
number of pre-authentications (npre) the UE can perform
before falling back to standard EAP-AKA authentication. The
WAAA and UE adjust the maximum value WC can reach
according to npre. In addition, the UE generates a nonce, UN.
(ii) Five new keys are generated.
(a) Root handover key, HOK. This key is derived from
EMSK by the HAAA and the UE only. Both nodes
use a special Pseudorandom Function (PRF) similar
to the one used in generating MSK in the standard
EAP-AKA protocol [11]
HOK = PRF(EMSK, EAP-AKA session ID
| HAAA ID | UEM, 256),
(1)
where “|” denotes concatenation and,
EAP-AKA session ID = (EAP Type Code|RAND|AUTN)
(2)
see, [29].
UEM is the UE address in the medium access control
layer. HAAA ID is the identity of the HAAA server.
(b) The domain-level handover key, DHOK. It is derived
from HOK by HAAA and UE only
DHOK = PRF(HOK, HN | WAAA ID | UEM, 256), (3)
where WAAA ID is the identity of the WAAA.
(c) The domain-level and local-level reauthentication
keys, DRK and LRK. Their derivation and usage are
detailed in [28].
(d) A key used to secure traﬃc between the UE and
WAAA, KWAAA-UE. This key is only derived by the UE
and WAAA
KWAAA-UE = PRF(DHOK⊕DRK | WAAA ID | UEM, 256).
(4)
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Figure 3: Modified EAP-AKA authentication protocol.
(iii) Secure delivery of DRK, DHOK, npre and IDWLAN by
the HAAA to the WAAA.
(iv) Secure delivery of LRK by the WAAA to the AP.
(v) Derivation of HOK, DHOK, DRK, LRK, and
KWAAA-UE by the UE.
3.3. Intra/Inter-WLAN Fast Pre-authentication. A UE roams
to a neighbor AP when experiencing poor signal-strength
from the currently associated AP. The Target AP (TAP)
might be in the same WLAN domain or belong to a
diﬀerent WLAN domain. Due to the lack of WLAN HH
authentication protocol support by 3GPP in UMTS-WLAN
interworking architecture and inadaptability of autonomous
WLAN HH authentication protocols, we designed Intra- and
Inter-WLAN Fast Pre-authentication protocols (Intra/Inter-
WLAN FP) to minimize authentication delay and signaling
overhead during intra- and inter-ESS HH. The proposed
protocols utilize EAP-AKA messages and can eﬃciently oper-
ate in the UMTS-WLAN interworking architecture. Intra-
WLAN FP is locally executed when the currently associated
AP and the TAP reside in the same WLAN domain. Inter-
WLAN FP is executed when the currently associated AP
and the TAP reside in diﬀerent WLAN domains. Intra/Inter-
WLAN FP minimizes the dependency on HSS and HAAA to
authenticate the UE which results in improved performance
without compromising security.
The UE needs to supply target AP and target WAAA
identities it requires to handover to, TAP ID and TWAAA ID.
Therefore we propose adjusting IEEE 802.11 Probe Response
management frames transmitted by the TAP to include its
identity and the identity of WAAA it is associated with as
Information Elements (IEs). Element IDs 7–15 and 32–255
are reserved for future use and can be used for this purpose
[22]. Handover related decisions like handover triggers and
best TAP selection is out of the scope of the paper. Figure 4
depicts Intra-WLAN FP operation.
In Intra-WLAN FP, the WAAA handles UE authentica-
tion instead of the HSS and HAAA. Intra-WLAN FP protocol
proceeds as follows.
(1) When the UE recognizes the need for handover,
it sends an EAPoL-start message to the currently
associated AP, not shown in Figure 4. The AP replies
with an identity request message.
(2) UE responds to the request with IDWLAN, TWAAA ID
and TAP ID.
(3) Receiving TWAAA ID and TAP ID indicates a han-
dover pre-authentication request. The WAAA clas-
sifies this request as an Intra-WLAN if the received
TWAAA ID matches its identity and the TAP ID
matches the identity of one of the APs in the WLAN
domain. The WAAA then consults WC and prepares
a challenge message that includes a fresh nonce, WN,
and the next IDWLAN as well as WC and MAC1Intra
calculated using KWAAA-UE,
MAC1Intra = SHA-1(KWAAA-UE, WC | IDWLAN | WN), (5)
where SHA-1 is the Secure Hash Algorithm.
(4) In the UE’s side, WC stored in the UE’s database
is matched with WC recently received. Then a
new MAC1Intra is calculated and compared with
the received MAC1Intra. If both checks are positive,
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Figure 4: Intra-WLAN Fast Pre-authentication protocol.
the UE stores IDWLAN and replies with WC and
MAC2Intra,
MAC2Intra = SHA-1(KWAAA-UE, WC | WN). (6)
(5) The WAAA then derives a local-level handover key,
LHOK, from DHOK as follows:
LHOK = PRF(DHOK, WC | TAP ID | UEM, 512). (7)
The WAAA also increments WC and sends EAP
success message to the UE. Consequently, the UE
derives LHOK and increments WC. WAAA and
TAP exchange Notify-Request and Notify-Accept
RADIUS AAA message to confirm handover oper-
ation [30]. Finally LHOK is pushed to the TAP
in RADIUS Access-Accept message with MS-MPPE-
Recv-Key attribute [11].
In Inter-WLAN FP, authentication procedure is completed
without the need to retrieve security keys from the HSS as
shown in Figure 5. The protocol proceeds as follows:
(1) The UE replies to the identity request message with
IDWLAN, TWAAA ID, and TAP ID.
(2) The handover pre-authentication request is classified
as Inter-WLAN by the WAAA if the TWAAA ID does
not match its identity and TAP ID does not match
any of the AP identities in the WLAN domain. The
WAAA retrieves the UE permanent ID and forwards
it along with the TAP ID and TWAAA ID to the
HAAA.
(3) Upon receiving the IDs, the HAAA recognize that an
Inter-WLAN FP is requested and prepares an authen-
tication challenge. The challenge includes the next
IDWLAN, UN, newly generated HN and MAC1Inter
MAC1Inter = SHA1(K auth, UN|IDWLAN|new HN). (8)
UN was previously received by the HAAA in the
modified EAP-AKA protocol.
(4) Upon receiving the authentication challenge, the UE
checks UN, calculates a new MAC1Inter and compares
it with the received MAC1Inter. If all verification
returns positive, IDWLAN is stored and a reply message
is prepared. The reply message includes the new HN,
newly generated UN, WC, and MAC2Inter,
MAC2Inter
= SHA-1(K auth, new UN | new HN | last HN | WC).
(9)
(5) Upon receiving the message, the HAAA consults
WC to verify that pre-authentication limit is not
exceeded and verifies MAC2Inter. If all verifications
are successful, the HAAA validates HOK lifetime,
generates a new DHOK and DRK and EAP Success
message is sent to the UE.
(6) Upon receiving EAP success message, the UE derives
a new DHOK, DRK, KTWAAA-UE, and LHOK. It also
increments WC.
(7) AAA message that includes DHOK, DRK, WC, npre,
UE permanent ID, IDWLAN, and TAP ID is sent to
the TWAAA by the HAAA. As a result, KTWAAA-UE
and LHOK are generated and WC is incremented
by TWAAA. Lastly, TWAAA confirms handover with
TAP by exchanging RADIUS AAA Notify-Request and
Notify-Accept message and forwards LHOK in Access-
Accept message.
At the conclusion of a successful Intra- or Inter-WLAN
FP, a fresh LHOK is held by the UE and the TAP. The
LHOK is used to generate TSK, which is then used to
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Figure 5: Inter-WLAN fast pre-authentication protocol.
derive additional keys that are needed to secure the link
between the UE and the TAP. EAP-AKA highly depends
on IEEE802.1X [31] protocol implemented in the AP to
successfully control UE’s network access. IEEE802.1X is a
port-based access control protocol. When an EAP session
completes successfully between the UE and the AP, normal
communications is permitted by the latter to pass through
an authorized port. Therefore, simultaneous exchange of
normal communications and EAP session is disallowed.
We propose two classes of Intra/Inter-WLAN FP execution
depending on the implementation of IEEE802.1X protocol
in the AP. The two classes diﬀer on whether IEEE802.1X
protocol in the AP permits single or multiport communi-
cations. Based on this, each class imposes diﬀerent eﬀect
on the authentication delay. Single-port communication
implies that normal communications between the UE and
the AP is disallowed when EAP session is executed. Multiport
communications implie that the AP can still handle normal
communications while processing EAP messages. Multiport
communications are achievable by simple modifications
to the IEEE802.1X protocol in the AP. In studying the
performance of our proposed protocols, both single-port
and multiport communications are considered.
4. Performance Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the performance of our proposed
pre-authentication protocols against EAP-AKA protocol.
Performance evaluation against protocols in the literature
like [15–19] is not reasonable because of the diﬀerence in
the network architecture. We considered three performance
metrics in our study, they are authentication signaling cost,
authentication delay, and the load on critical nodes in the
UMTS-WLAN interworking architecture.
4.1. UE Movement and Authentication Scenarios. Perfor-
mance evaluations are studied based on a fixed path UE
movement. This movement might not reflect realistic UE
paths but it is considered here for performance evaluation
purposes only. Initially, the UE is connected to AP1 in
WLAN1 as depicted in Figure 6. The UE then performs two
intra-ESS HH to APs 2 and 3 in WLAN1, respectively. Later,
it performs an inter-ESS HH to AP1 in WLAN2 followed by
two intra-ESS HH to AP2 and AP3 in WLAN2, respectively.
Three authentication scenarios are considered in the
performance study.
Scenario 1 (Sc1). This scenario adopts authentication pro-
tocols specified by 3GPP [3]. The UE performs EAP-AKA
authentication whenever it starts communicating with an AP
regardless whether HH was performed or not.
Scenario 2 (Sc2). This scenario executes our proposed
modifications to EAP-AKA protocols and Intra/Inter-WLAN
FP protocols. The IEEE802.1X protocol in the APs in this
scenario supports single-port communications.




















Figure 6: UE movement.
Scenario 3 (Sc3). This scenario is identical to Sc2 in terms of
message signaling, however, IEEE802.1X protocol in the APs
supports multiport communications. Therefore, the UE and
APs are capable of handling normal communications while
processing EAP messages for pre-authentication purposes.
Our proposed pre-authentication protocols represented
by Sc2 and Sc3 are expected to show similar results in terms
of authentication, signaling cost, and the load on critical
nodes, however, authentication delay experienced by these
scenarios should distinctly diﬀer. Authentication protocols
invoked in Sc2 and Sc3 depend on the number of permitted
pre-authentications (npre). For example, setting npre to 1,
3, and 5 mean that our modified EAP-AKA protocol is
going to be invoked thrice, twice, and once, respectively.
The value of npre should be carefully chosen by the service
provider; very high value might negatively aﬀect security
because of frequent reuse of HOK and DHOK while very low
values might negatively aﬀect performance due to contacting
UHN repeatedly for authentication. Figure 7 depicts the
authentication protocols in Sc1 and Sc2 when npre = 5.
4.2. Authentication Signaling Cost. Studying the signaling
cost produced by an authentication protocol is an impor-
tant metric in evaluating its performance. Authentication
signaling cost is the accumulative traﬃc load introduced in
the network by exchanging authentication signaling during
a communication session [32]. For simplicity, all nodes are
a single hop (H) apart except between WAAA and HAAA.
The authentication signaling cost (C) for the authentication







MEAP-AKA( mod ) +4 MIntra +MInter
)×S×Nm,
(10)
where (M) is the number of messages exchanged in each
authentication protocol, S is the average message size, it is set
to 100 bytes. Nm is the average number of UE movements
during a session, Nm = Ts/Tr. Ts is the average session time,
it is set to 1000 seconds. Tr is the average WLAN resident
time, it varies from 10 to 40 seconds. Figure 8 shows the
authentication signaling cost against UE resident time when
HWAAA-HAAA = 3 for diﬀerent npre values.
Generally the higher the UE resident time the less
authentication signaling is generated. It is clear from the
figure that the authentication signaling cost of Sc2 is less
than Sc1. Our proposal reduces signaling cost by 13% when
compared to Sc1 when npre = 1. Improved performance
results are achieved when increasing npre value. Reduction
in signaling cost experienced in Sc2 reaches up to 21%
and 29% in comparison to Sc1 when setting npre values to
3 and 5, respectively. As discussed earlier, Sc1 experience
the same signaling cost in spite of npre value. Increasing
npre value means reducing the frequency of invoking the
modified EAP-AKA protocol and permitting additional local
pre-authentications without the need to contact UHN hence
achieving drastic reduction in authentication signaling cost.
4.3. Authentication Delay. Authentication delay plays an
important factor in the overall handover delay. In this paper
we assume that delays that constitute handover delay, other
than authentication delay, like AP scanning delay and MIP
registration delay have an equal eﬀect on all authentication
scenarios. Authentication delay is calculated starting from
sending EAP Request/Identity message and ends by invoking
the 4-way handshake protocol. Generally, the delay between











whereMA-B(wl/wi) signifies the number of messages exchanged
between nodes A and B in the wireless network and
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Figure 7: Authentication scenarios when npre = 5.
wired network, respectively, HA-B are the number of hops
separating A and B in the wired network, Dtrans(wl/wi) are
the transmission delay that includes propagation and routing
delay in the wireless and wired networks, respectively.
Dtrans(wl) is set to 2 milliseconds while Dtrans(wi) is set to
0.5 milliseconds. Dproc is the nodal processing delay which
includes queuing delay, it is set to 0.001 milliseconds. All
parameter values used in the study are taken from [32].
From (11), authentication delay (T) of each authentication
protocol is calculated. The authentication delay in the
standard and modified EAP-AKA when npre = 5 is given by
TEAP-AKA(stnd)

















+ 2DAV + D4.
(12)
The authentication delay for Intra/Inter-WLAN FP in Sc2
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TIntra-Sc3 = 3Dtrans-wi + 6Dproc + D4,
TInter-Sc3 = 6Dtrans-wi + 12Dproc + D4. (13)
D4 denotes the delay incurred by executing the 4-way
handshake protocol, it is set to 20 milliseconds. Note that
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Figure 9: Authentication delay in Sc1, Sc2, and Sc3 when varying
HWAAA-HAAA.
Table 1: Number of keys generated in the three authentication
scenarios.
Sc1 Sc2 = Sc3
npre — 1 3 5
UE 36 39 29 19
WAAA1 0 5 4 4
WAAA2 0 5 5 4
HAAA 24 23 16 9
HSS 12 6 4 2
Total: all nodes 72 78 58 38
Total: critical nodes 72 68 49 30
Total key size in UE (byte) 1272 1500 1160 820
DAV is the processing delay of generating AVs using “f1–
f5” functions in the HSS and USIM, it is set to 0.001
milliseconds. The processing delays incurred by generating
new keys in our proposed protocols by WAAA are expressed
as a normal processing delay (Dproc). This is because WAAAs
are usually equipped with high processing capabilities and
control far less number of UEs compared to HSS and HAAA.
Although our proposed protocols in Sc2 and Sc3 undergo
similar authentication signaling cost, they diﬀer distinctly in
the authentication delay. The total authentication delay (TD)
for each scenario when npre = 5 is calculated as follows:
TDSc1 = 6TEAP-AKA(stnd),
TDSc2 = TEAP-AKA( mod ) + 4 TIntra-Sc2 + TInter-Sc2,
TDSc3 = TEAP-AKA( mod ) + 4 TIntra-Sc3 + TInter-Sc3.
(14)
By varying HWAAA-HAAA and npre values, we can compare
the authentication delays of the three scenarios. Figure 9
shows the authentication delay of each scenario for diﬀerent
npre values. Our protocols represented by Sc2 and Sc3
outperform standard authentication protocol. When npre =
1, authentication delay in Sc2 is slightly less than Sc1 due to
multiple execution of the modified EAP-AKA authentication
which is a delay intensive operation. However, since Sc3 takes
advantage of the multiport communications in the AP, it
experiences much less delay reduction comparing to Sc1. Our
proposed protocols demonstrate exceptional results when
increasing npre value as shown in Figure 9. When npre = 3
and HWAAA-HAAA = 8, delay reduction in Sc2 and Sc3 reaches
up to 12% and 30%, respectively, compared to Sc1.
When npre = 5, our protocols capitalize on the single
execution of the modified EAP-AKA protocol to perform
several pre-authentications without the need to involve HSS
and HAAA in the authentication procedure which ultimately
reduces authentication signaling cost and authentication
delay. In such settings, authentication delay reduction in
Sc2 and Sc3 reaches up to 16% and 38% comparing to
Sc1. Increasing npre value reflects in more reductions in the
authentication delay in our proposed protocols comparing to
the standard protocol. This feature illustrates the superiority
and suitability of our proposed protocols to sustain quality
of service of delay-sensitive applications running on the UE.
4.4. Load on Critical Nodes. In UMTS-WLAN interworking
architecture, critical nodes involved in the authentication
procedure are HSS, HAAA, and the UE. HSS and HAAA are
considered critical because they handle the authentication
of hundreds of thousands of UEs. The UE is considered
critical as well because of the limitation in its processing
capabilities. In EAP-AKA, key generation and distribution
schemes are included in the authentication procedure.
In our proposed protocols, HSS and HAAA delegate the
authentication responsibility to trusted WAAA. Therefore,
the processing overhead on these critical nodes is reduced.
Since our modifications to EAP-AKA introduced additional
keys generated by UE, HAAA, and WAAA, a study on the
eﬀect of the additional keys was important. In our study we
considered the number and memory sizes of keys introduced
in each authentication protocol starting from CK and IK
down the hierarchy to the key used in the 4-way handshake
protocol, that is, MSK in Sc1 and LHOK/LRK in Sc2.
Figure 10 illustrates the keys generated by each node during
UE movement when npre = 5. Table 1 indicates the total
number of keys generated by all nodes for diﬀerent npre
values.
As indicated by Table 1, the total number of keys
generated by all nodes in Sc2 decreases as npre value increase.
When npre = 1, Sc2 generates 6 more keys in total comparing
to Sc1 due to frequent execution of the modified EAP-AKA
protocol. As npre value increase, the frequency of executing
the modified EAP-AKA protocol decreases and hence fewer
keys are generated. When increasing npre to 5, the total
number of keys generated by all nodes in Sc2 is almost half
of that generated in Sc1. Critical nodes in Sc2 generate 4
keys less than Sc1 when npre is set to 1, Sc2 generates less
than half the number of keys generated in Sc1 when npre
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Figure 11: Number of keys generated by HSS and HAAA.
is set to 5. Critical nodes in Sc2 generate and maintain
far less number of keys compared to their counterparts in
Sc1 because the WAAA handle some of the key generation
activity. The number of keys generated by critical nodes in
addition to WAAA1 and WAAA2 in Sc2 is 58 and 38 when
npre = 3 and npre = 5, respectively, which is clearly less than
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Figure 12: Memory storage space required by the UE to store
security keys.
From Table 1, the number of keys generated by HSS and
HAAA in Sc1 is always greater than the number of keys
generated by HSS and HAAA in Sc2. This is also illustrated in
Figure 11. Number of keys generated by HSS and HAAA are
29, 20, and 11 when npre is set to 1, 3, and 5, respectively,
compared to 36 keys generated in Sc1. This advantage is
highly valued when more UEs roam to the network. For
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role waaaserver
(
P, WAAA, AP1, AP2 : agent, % UE, WAAA server, Access Point 1 and 2
F1, HMAC : hash func, % MAC generation and key generation functions
KPW, KAP1W, KAP2W, DHOK: symmetric key,
WCN, AP2 ID : text, % WLAN counter and AP2 ID
SND AP1W, RCV AP1W, SND AP2W, RCV AP2W : channel (dy))
played by WAAA def=
local
WN, INTRA ID : text, % WAAA nonce and UE ID
WCNE : {text} symmetric key,
MAC1 INTRA, LHOK : hash (symmetric key.text.text.text),
MAC2 INTRA : hash (symmetric key.text.text),
State : nat
const
request id, respond id, success : text,
lhok3, wn1, wn2 : protocol id
init State := 2
transition
1. State = 2 /\ RCV AP1W (respond id.INTRA ID′) = | >
State′ := 5 /\WN′ := new() /\WCNE′ := WCN KPW
/\MAC1 INTRA′ := HMAC (KPW.INTRA ID′.WN′.WCN)
/\ SND AP1W (WN′.MAC1 INTRA′.WCNE′)
/\ witness (WAAA, P, wn1, WN′) % for UE to authenticate WAAA
2. State = 5 /\ RCV AP1W (WCNE′.MAC2 INTRA′)
/\MAC2 INTRA′= HMAC (KPW.WN.WCN) = | >
State′ := 8 /\ LHOK′ := F1 (DHOK.WCN.INTRA ID.AP2 ID)
/\ request (WAAA, P, wn2, WN) % for WAAA to authenticate UE
/\ SND AP1W (success) /\ SND AP2W (success.{LHOK′} KAP2W)
/\ secret (LHOK′, lhok3, {P, WAAA, AP2})
end role
Figure 13: HLPSL code describing WAAA’s role in Intra-WLAN FP.
example, when 5 UEs exist in the network and followed
the same movement indicated by Figure 6, HSS and HAAA
end up generating 180 keys in Sc1 while only 55 keys are
necessary in Sc2 when npre = 5. This shows that our proposed
protocols are capable of managing large number of UEs
in the interworking architecture eﬃciently comparing to
standard EAP-AKA protocol.
Since the UE has limited processing capabilities and
storage capacity, we evaluated the number of keys generated
by it as well as the memory size required to store security
keys. Continuing a similar trend, the UE generates less
number of keys as the value of npre increases. Generally the
number of keys generated by the UE in Sc2 is less than Sc1
when npre > 2. Furthermore, while the UE requires 1.272
Kbytes of storage space in Sc1, it needs 1.160 Kbytes and
820 bytes of storage space in Sc2 when npre is set to 3 and 5,
respectively. Figure 12 illustrates the amount of storage space
required by the UE. Since the modified EAP-AKA protocol is
invoked thrice when npre = 1 in Sc2, more storage space to
store the keys in the UE is anticipated.
5. Security Analysis
Performance improvements to authentication protocols
should not compromise its security. In this section we ana-
lyze the security of the proposed protocols in terms of sup-
porting secured key management scheme, mutual authen-
tication service, protection of the integrity of exchanged
messages, and protection of transmitted identities.
5.1. Secured Key Management. Keys must be held by the
minimum number of nodes possible. Unnecessary distri-
bution of keys must be avoided and keys must be unique
to key holders. Additionally, keys must never be shared
between nodes from the same hierarchal level and keys
used directly in protecting communication messages must
not be reused. These measures are collectively known as
the principle of least privilege, which prevents the “domino
eﬀect” problem [33] in key management protocols. Our
protocols are designed to abide by the principles of least
privilege. For example, DHOK is only generated by the
UE and HAAA because no other node has access to HOK
and HN values used in the generation process. This key
is only used by the UE and WAAA and never shared
between diﬀerent WAAA servers residing in diﬀerent WLAN
networks. Similarly, LHOK is only generated by the UE and
WAAA because no other node has access to DHOK and
WC values used in the generation process. LHOK is used by
the UE and TAP only and is never shared between diﬀerent
TAPs and never reused in future pre-authentications. To
emphasize the principle of least privilege, the HAAA must
delete DHOK from its database after delivering it to the
WAAA. Likewise, the WAAA must delete LHOK from its
database after delivering it to the TAP.
Keys, nonces, and counters are securely transmitted
to protect against eavesdropping attacks. No keys are
transmitted in the WLAN link between the UE and AP.
Sensitive security information traveling between the HAAA
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role peer (
P, WAAA1, WAAA2, AP1, AP2, HAAA : agent, %UE, WAAA servers, APs and HAAA
F1,HMAC : hash func, %MAC generation and key generation functions
KPH : symmetric key, % shared key between UE and HAAA
HOK, MSK : symmetric key,
HN, UN : text, % HAAA nonce and UE nonce
WAAA2 ID, AP2 ID : text, % WAAA2 AND AP2 identities
SND AP1P, RCV AP1P : channel (dy))
played by P def=
local
NUN, NHN, WCN, INTER ID : text, % New UN, New HN, WLAN Counter, UE Identity
WCNE : {text} symmetric key,
MAC1 INTER, DHOK, LHOK : hash (symmetric key.text.text.text),
MAC2 INTER : hash (symmetric key.text.text.text.text),
State : nat
const
request id, respond id, success : text,
lhok1, nhn1, nhn2 : protocol id
init State := 1
transition
1. State = 1 /\ RCV AP1P (request id) = | >
State′ := 5 /\ INTER ID′ := new() /\ SND AP1P (respond id.INTER ID′)
2. State = 5 /\ RCV AP1P ({NHN′} KPH.UN′.MAC1 INTER′)
/\MAC1 INTER′ =HMAC (KPH.UN.INTER ID.NHN′) = | >
State′ := 9 /\ NUN′ := new()
/\MAC2 INTER′ := HMAC (KPH.NUN′.NHN′.HN.WCN)
/\WCNE′ := {WCN} KPH
/\ SND AP1P (WCNE′.{NUN′} KPH.{NHN′} KPH.MAC2 INTER′)
/\ request (P, HAAA, nhn1, NHN′)
/\ witness (P, HAAA, nhn2, NHN′)
3. State = 9 /\ RCV AP1P (success) = | >
State′ := 13 /\ DHOK′ := F1 (HOK.NHN.WAAA2 ID.INTER ID)
/\ LHOK′ := F1 (DHOK.WCN.AP2 ID.INTER ID)
/\ secret (LHOK′, lhok1,{P, WAAA2, AP2}) % to assure secrecy of
% LHOK between UE, TWAAA and
% TAP
end role
Figure 14: HLPSL code describing UE’s role in Inter-WLAN FP.
and WAAA and between WAAA and TAP are protected by
the LTSA previously established between them. Nonces and
counters are encrypted with KWAAA-UE in Intra-WLAN FP
and with K encr in Inter-WLAN FP when traveling in the
WLAN link between the UE and AP. Furthermore, all keys are
freshly generated to defend against replay attacks. EMSK and
HOK are fresh because a new RAND and AUTN values are
used to generate them. DHOK is fresh because a new HN is
used to generate it. Since DHOK is fresh,KWAAA-UE is believed
to be fresh as well. Finally, LHOK is fresh because WC is used
to generate it which is continuously incremented after every
successful pre-authentication.
5.2. Mutual Authentication and Keys Secrecy. Our proposed
protocols provide mutual authentication service to protect
against Man-In-the-Middle attacks (MITM), impersonation
attacks, and rogue AP attacks. To verify this, we tested our
protocols using formal security verification tool known as
the “Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols
and Applications” (AVISPA) [34]. AVISPA package is a
state-of-the-art tool for the automatic verification and
analysis of Internet security protocols. AVISPA integrates
automatic security analysis and verification back-end servers
like “On-the-Fly Model-Checker” (OFMC), “Constraint-
Logic-based Attack Searcher” (Cl-AtSe), and SAT-based
Model-Checker (SATMC). Protocols under examination
by AVISPA must be coded in the “High Level Protocol
Specifications Language” (HLPSL) to be tested by the back-
end servers.
HLPSL is an expressive, role-based formal language used
to describe the details of the protocols in question. Typically,
HLPSL code includes the roles played by all the principals
in the security protocol, like UE, WAAA, and HAAA, as
well as the role of the environment and the security goals
that has to be achieved. Figure 13 illustrates WAAA’s role in
Intra-WLAN FP expressed in HLPSL. To permit testing the
support of secured mutual authentication between the UE
and WAAA, request and witness terms are used. The state-
ment (request(WAAA,P,wn2,WN)) in Figure 13 indicates the
requirement that the WAAA authenticates the UE while
the statement (witness(WAAA, P, wn1, WN′)) indicates the
requirement that the WAAA should be authenticated by
the UE. Figure 14 illustrates UE’s role in Inter-WLAN FP
expressed in HLPSL. To permit testing the confidentiality
of LHOK, the term secret is used. The statement (secret
(LHOK′, lhok1, {P, WAAA2, AP2}) in Figure 14 indicates the
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(a) (b)
Figure 15: (a) Message returned by SPAN as a result of testing Intra-WLAN FP with OFMC. (b) Message returned by SPAN as a result of
testing Inter-WLAN FP with Cl-AtSe.
Figure 16: Message returned by AVISPA web interface after testing Intra-WLAN FP with SATMC.
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requirement to keep LHOK confidential to the UE, TWAAA,
and the TAP.
The support of secured mutual authentication in addi-
tion to the secrecy of keys in Intra/Inter-WLAN FP was tested
using OFMC, Cl-AtSe, and four SAT solvers in SATMC. All
tests returned positive results and confirmed the security of
mutual authentication service and no authentication attacks
were found. Results also confirmed the secrecy of LHOK and
no vulnerabilities were discovered. A stand-alone graphical
version of the AVISPA package was used in testing our
protocols named Security Protocol ANimator for AVISPA
(SPAN). Figure 15(a) demonstrate the messages returned by
SPAN as a result of testing Intra-WLAN FP with OFMC and
Figure 15(b) shows the message returned by SPAN as a result
of testing Inter-WLAN FP protocol by Cl-AtSe. Figure 16
shows results of testing Intra-WLAN FP with zchaﬀ SAT
solver in SATMC. AVISPA Web Interface was used in SATMC
testing because of problems running SATMC in the stand-
alone version. Output text was rearranged to fit in a single
screen.
5.3. Protection of Message Integrity. The integrity of authenti-
cation challenges and responses are protected by appending a
Message Authentication Code (MAC) that covers important
information carried in EAP messages. MAC preserves the
integrity of EAP message, protects against MITM attacks,
and validates the authenticity of the sender. In Intra-WLAN
FP, MACIntra is calculated using KWAAA-UE while MACInter is
calculated using K auth in Inter-WLAN FP. MAC2Inter plays
an important role to assure the authenticity of the UE to the
HAAA by including the last HN value.
5.4. Protection of Identities. It is always desirable to conceal
the identity of the UE, TAP ID, and TWAAA ID to protect
against eavesdropping and tracking of UE movement. In
our proposed protocols, the UE is supplied a local ID,
IDWLAN, to be used in future pre-authentications instead of
its permanent ID. Local IDs are one-timer identifiers valid
for a single pre-authentication session. Therefore, a UE must
obtain a new local ID for the subsequent pre-authentication
procedure. New local IDs sent by the WAAA and received by
the UE are encrypted with KWAAA-UE and K encr in Intra-
WLAN FP and Inter-WLAN FP, respectively. Current local
IDs supplied by the UE and received by the WAAA cannot
be encrypted because the identity of the UE must be known
to extract the proper decryption key. This is the only case
the local ID travels in clear text. This clear text transmission
does not form a threat since this local ID is not reused
in the future. TWAAA ID and TAP ID are also encrypted
with KWAAA-UE when transmitted by the UE to the WAAA to
defend against rogue AP attacks as well as to prevent tracking
UE’s movement.
6. Conclusions
It is common for UEs to perform horizontal handovers
within and between WLANs in UMTS-WLAN interworking
architecture due to the limited coverage area of WLAN
networks. Handover delays aﬀect the Quality of Service of
applications running on the UE. It is always desirable to
minimize handover delays. One of the major factors of
delay during handover is the delay of mutual authentication
between the UE and authentication servers. We designed
pre-authentication protocols to reduce authentication delays
that occur during intra- and inter-ESS horizontal handovers
in UMTS-WLAN interworking environments. The proposed
intra- and inter-WLAN pre-authentication protocols proved
to surpass existing authentication protocols in terms of
authentication signaling cost, authentication delay, and the
load the authentication protocol places on critical nodes.
The proposed protocols also achieve important security
goals like the support of secured key management scheme
and the support of mutual authentication service. The
security of our protocols was verified by the “Automated
Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications”
(AVISPA) package. Examination of our protocols by AVISPA
demonstrated its resistance to authentication attacks and
confirmed key’s confidentiality.
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